Book 4, Chapter 8: Civil Religion explained simply
The Social Contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau
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At first men had no kings save the gods, and no government save theocracy. They reasoned like Caligula, and, at that period, reasoned aright. It takes a long time for feeling so to change that men can make up their minds to take their equals as masters, in the hope that they will profit by doing…
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CHAPTER VIII
CIVIL RELIGION
At first men had no kings save the gods, and no government save
theocracy. They reasoned like Caligula, and, at that period, reasoned
aright. It takes a long time for feeling so to change that men can make
up their minds to take their equals as masters, in the hope that they
will profit by doing so.
From the mere fact that God was set over every political society, it
followed that there were as many gods as peoples. Two peoples that were
strangers the one to the other, and almost always enemies, could not
long recognise the same master: two armies giving battle could not obey
the same leader. National divisions thus led to polytheism, and this in
turn gave rise to theological and civil intolerance, which, as we shall
see hereafter, are by nature the same.
The fancy the Greeks had for rediscovering their gods among the
barbarians arose from the way they had of regarding themselves as the
natural Sovereigns of such peoples. But there is nothing so absurd
as the erudition which in our days identifies and confuses gods of
different nations. As if Moloch, Saturn and Chronos could be the same
god! As if the Phœnician Baal, the Greek Zeus, and the Latin Jupiter
could be the same! As if there could still be anything common to
imaginary beings with different names!
If it is asked how in pagan times, where each State had its cult
and its gods, there were no wars of religion, I answer that it was
precisely because each State, having its own cult as well as its
own government, made no distinction between its gods and its laws.
Political war was also theological; the provinces of the gods were, so
to speak, fixed by the boundaries of nations. The god of one people had
no right over another. The gods of the pagans were not jealous gods;
they shared among themselves the empire of the world: even Moses and
the Hebrews sometimes lent themselves to this view by speaking of the
God of Israel. It is true, they regarded as powerless the gods of
the Canaanites, a proscribed people condemned to destruction, whose
place they were to take; but remember how they spoke of the divisions
of the neighbouring peoples they were forbidden to attack! "Is not
the possession of what belongs to your god Chamos lawfully your due?"
said Jephthah to the Ammonites. "We have the same title to the lands
our conquering God has made his own." Here, I think, there is a
recognition that the rights of Chamos and those of the God of Israel
are of the same nature.
But when the Jews, being subject to the kings of Babylon, and,
subsequently, to those of Syria, still obstinately refused to recognise
any god save their own, their refusal was regarded as rebellion against
their conqueror, and drew down on them the persecutions we read of
in their history, which are without parallel till the coming of
Christianity.
Every religion, therefore, being attached solely to the laws of the
State which prescribed it, there was no way of converting a people
except by enslaving it, and there could be no missionaries save
conquerors. The obligation to change cults being the law to which the
vanquished yielded, it was necessary to be victorious before suggesting
such a change. So far from men fighting for the gods, the gods, as in
Homer, fought for men; each asked his god for victory, and repayed him
with new altars. The Romans, before taking a city, summoned its gods
to quit it; and, in leaving the Tarentines their outraged gods, they
regarded them as subject to their own and compelled to do them homage.
They left the vanquished their gods as they left them their laws. A
wreath to the Jupiter of the Capitol was often the only tribute they
imposed.
Finally, when, along with their empire, the Romans had spread their
cult and their gods, and had themselves often adopted those of the
vanquished, by granting to both alike the rights of the city, the
peoples of that vast empire insensibly found themselves with multitudes
of gods and cults, everywhere almost the same; and thus paganism
throughout the known world finally came to be one and the same religion.
It was in these circumstances that Jesus came to set up on earth a
spiritual kingdom, which, by separating the theological from the
political system, made the State no longer one, and brought about
the internal divisions which have never ceased to trouble Christian
peoples. As the new idea of a kingdom of the other world could never
have occurred to pagans, they always looked on the Christians as really
rebels, who, while feigning to submit, were only waiting for the chance
to make themselves independent and their masters, and to usurp by guile
the authority they pretended in their weakness to respect. This was the
cause of the persecutions.
What the pagans had feared took place. Then everything changed its
aspect: the humble Christians changed their language, and soon this
so-called kingdom of the other world turned, under a visible leader,
into the most violent of earthly despotisms.
However, as there have always been a prince and civil laws, this double
power and conflict of jurisdiction have made all good polity impossible
in Christian States; and men have never succeeded in finding out
whether they were bound to obey the master or the priest.
Several peoples, however, even in Europe and its neighbourhood, have
desired without success to preserve or restore the old system: but
the spirit of Christianity has everywhere prevailed. The sacred cult
has always remained or again become independent of the Sovereign, and
there has been no necessary link between it and the body of the State.
Mahomet held very sane views, and linked his political system well
together; and, as long as the form of his government continued under
the caliphs who succeeded him, that government was indeed one, and so
far good. But the Arabs, having grown prosperous, lettered, civilised,
slack and cowardly, were conquered by barbarians: the division between
the two powers began again; and, although it is less apparent among
the Mahometans than among the Christians, it none the less exists,
especially in the sect of Ali, and there are States, such as Persia,
where it is continually making itself felt.
Among us, the Kings of England have made themselves heads of the
Church, and the Czars have done the same: but this title has made them
less its masters than its ministers; they have gained not so much the
right to change it, as the power to maintain it: they are not its
legislators, but only its princes. Wherever the clergy is a corporate
body, it is master and legislator in its own country. There are
thus two powers, two Sovereigns, in England and in Russia, as well as
elsewhere.
Of all Christian writers, the philosopher Hobbes alone has seen the
evil and how to remedy it, and has dared to propose the reunion of the
two heads of the eagle, and the restoration throughout of political
unity, without which no State or government will ever be rightly
constituted. But he should have seen that the masterful spirit of
Christianity is incompatible with his system, and that the priestly
interest would always be stronger than that of the State. It is not so
much what is false and terrible in his political theory, as what is
just and true, that has drawn down hatred on it.
I believe that if the study of history were developed from this point
of view, it would be easy to refute the contrary opinions of Bayle and
Warburton, one of whom holds that religion can be of no use to the body
politic, while the other, on the contrary, maintains that Christianity
is its strongest support. We should demonstrate to the former that
no State has ever been founded without a religious basis, and to the
latter, that the law of Christianity at bottom does more harm by
weakening than good by strengthening the constitution of the State. To
make myself understood, I have only to make a little more exact the too
vague ideas of religion as relating to this subject.
Religion, considered in relation to society, which is either general
or particular, may also be divided into two kinds: the religion of
man, and that of the citizen. The first, which has neither temples,
nor altars, nor rites, and is confined to the purely internal cult
of the supreme God and the eternal obligations of morality, is the
religion of the Gospel pure and simple, the true theism, what may be
called natural divine right or law. The other, which is codified in a
single country, gives it its gods, its own tutelary patrons; it has its
dogmas, its rites, and its external cult prescribed by law; outside the
single nation that follows it, all the world is in its sight infidel,
foreign and barbarous; the duties and rights of man extend for it only
as far as its own altars. Of this kind were all the religions of early
peoples, which we may define as civil or positive divine right or law.
There is a third sort of religion of a more singular kind, which gives
men two codes of legislation, two rulers, and two countries, renders
them subject to contradictory duties, and makes it impossible for
them to be faithful both to religion and to citizenship. Such are
the religions of the Lamas and of the Japanese, and such is Roman
Christianity, which may be called the religion of the priest. It leads
to a sort of mixed and anti-social code which has no name.
In their political aspect, all these three kinds of religion have their
defects. The third is so clearly bad, that it is waste of time to stop
to prove it such. All that destroys social unity is worthless; all
institutions that set man in contradiction to himself are worthless.
The second is good in that it unites the divine cult with love of
the laws, and, making country the object of the citizens' adoration,
teaches them that service done to the State is service done to its
tutelary god. It is a form of theocracy, in which there can be no
pontiff save the prince, and no priests save the magistrates. To die
for one's country then becomes martyrdom; violation of its laws,
impiety; and to subject one who is guilty to public execration is to
condemn him to the anger of the gods: Sacer estod.
On the other hand, it is bad in that, being founded on lies and error,
it deceives men, makes them credulous and superstitious, and drowns the
true cult of the Divinity in empty ceremonial. It is bad, again, when
it becomes tyrannous and exclusive, and makes a people bloodthirsty and
intolerant, so that it breathes fire and slaughter, and regards as a
sacred act the killing of every one who does not believe in its gods.
The result is to place such a people in a natural state of war with all
others, so that its security is deeply endangered.
There remains therefore the religion of man or Christianity--not the
Christianity of to-day, but that of the Gospel, which is entirely
different. By means of this holy, sublime, and real religion all men,
being children of one God, recognise one another as brothers, and the
society that unites them is not dissolved even at death.
But this religion, having no particular relation to the body politic,
leaves the laws in possession of the force they have in themselves
without making any addition to it; and thus one of the great bonds that
unite society considered in severalty fails to operate. Nay, more, so
far from binding the hearts of the citizens to the State, it has the
effect of taking them away from all earthly things. I know of nothing
more contrary to the social spirit.
We are told that a people of true Christians would form the most
perfect society imaginable. I see in this supposition only one great
difficulty: that a society of true Christians would not be a society of
men.
I say further that such a society, with all its perfection, would be
neither the strongest nor the most lasting: the very fact that it was
perfect would rob it of its bond of union; the flaw that would destroy
it would lie in its very perfection.
Every one would do his duty; the people would be law-abiding, the
rulers just and temperate; the magistrates upright and incorruptible;
the soldiers would scorn death; there would be neither vanity nor
luxury. So far, so good; but let us hear more.
Christianity as a religion is entirely spiritual, occupied solely with
heavenly things; the country of the Christian is not of this world. He
does his duty, indeed, but does it with profound indifference to the
good or ill success of his cares. Provided he has nothing to reproach
himself with, it matters little to him whether things go well or ill
here on earth. If the State is prosperous, he hardly dares to share
in the public happiness, for fear he may grow proud of his country's
glory; if the State is languishing, he blesses the hand of God that is
hard upon His people.
For the State to be peaceable and for harmony to be maintained, all the
citizens without exception would have to be good Christians; if by ill
hap there should be a single self-seeker or hypocrite, a Catiline or a
Cromwell, for instance, he would certainly get the better of his pious
compatriots. Christian charity does not readily allow a man to think
hardly of his neighbours. As soon as, by some trick, he has discovered
the art of imposing on them and getting hold of a share in the public
authority, you have a man established in dignity; it is the will of
God that he be respected: very soon you have a power; it is God's will
that it be obeyed: and if the power is abused by him who wields it,
it is the scourge wherewith God punishes His children. There would be
scruples about driving out the usurper: public tranquillity would have
to be disturbed, violence would have to be employed, and blood spilt;
all this accords ill with Christian meekness; and after all, in this
vale of sorrows, what does it matter whether we are free men or serfs?
The essential thing is to get to heaven, and resignation is only an
additional means of doing so.
If war breaks out with another State, the citizens march readily out
to battle; not one of them thinks of flight; they do their duty, but
they have no passion for victory; they know better how to die than
how to conquer. What does it matter whether they win or lose? Does
not Providence know better than they what is meet for them? Only
think to what account a proud, impetuous and passionate enemy could
turn their stoicism! Set over against them those generous peoples who
were devoured by ardent love of glory and of their country, imagine
your Christian republic face to face with Sparta or Rome: the pious
Christians will be beaten, crushed and destroyed, before they know
where they are, or will owe their safety only to the contempt their
enemy will conceive for them. It was to my mind a fine oath that was
taken by the soldiers of Fabius, who swore, not to conquer or die, but
to come back victorious--and kept their oath. Christians, would never
have taken such an oath; they would have looked on it as tempting God.
But I am mistaken in speaking of a Christian republic; the terms
are mutually exclusive. Christianity preaches only servitude and
dependence. Its spirit is so favourable to tyranny that it always
profits by such a régime. True Christians are made to be slaves,
and they know it and do not much mind: this short life counts for too
little in their eyes.
I shall be told that Christian troops are excellent. I deny it. Show
me an instance. For my part, I know of no Christian troops. I shall be
told of the Crusades. Without disputing the valour of the Crusaders,
I answer that, so far from being Christians, they were the priests'
soldiery, citizens of the Church. They fought for their spiritual
country, which the Church had, somehow or other, made temporal. Well
understood, this goes back to paganism: as the Gospel sets up no
national religion, a holy war is impossible among Christians.
Under the pagan emperors, the Christian soldiers were brave; every
Christian writer affirms it, and I believe it: it was a case of
honourable emulation of the pagan troops. As soon as the emperors were
Christian, this emulation no longer existed, and, when the Cross had
driven out the eagle, Roman valour wholly disappeared.
But, setting aside political considerations, let us come back to what
is right, and settle our principles on this important point. The right
which the social compact gives the Sovereign over the subjects does
not, we have seen, exceed the limits of public expediency. The
subjects then owe the Sovereign an account of their opinions only to
such an extent as they matter to the community. Now, it matters very
much to the community that each citizen should have a religion. That
will make him love his duty; but the dogmas of that religion concern
the State and its members only so far as they have reference to
morality and to the duties which he who professes them is bound to do
to others. Each man may have, over and above, what opinions he pleases,
without it being the Sovereign's business to take cognisance of them;
for, as the Sovereign has no authority in the other world, whatever
the lot of its subjects may be in the life to come, that is not its
business, provided they are good citizens in this life.
There is therefore a purely civil profession of faith of which the
Sovereign should fix the articles, not exactly as religious dogmas, but
as social sentiments without which a man cannot be a good citizen or
a faithful subject. While it can compel no one to believe them, it
can banish from the State whoever does not believe them--it can banish
him, not for impiety, but as an anti-social being, incapable of truly
loving the laws and justice, and of sacrificing, at need, his life to
his duty. If any one, after publicly recognising these dogmas, behaves
as if he does not believe them, let him be punished by death: he has
committed the worst of all crimes, that of lying before the law.
The dogmas of ought to be few, simple, and exactly
worded, without explanation or commentary. The existence of a mighty,
intelligent and beneficent Divinity, possessed of foresight and
providence, the life to come, the happiness of the just, the punishment
of the wicked, the sanctity of the social contract and the laws:
these are its positive dogmas. Its negative dogmas I confine to one,
intolerance, which is a part of the cults we have rejected.
Those who distinguish civil from theological intolerance are, to my
mind, mistaken. The two forms are inseparable. It is impossible to
live at peace with those we regard as damned; to love them would be
to hate God who punishes them: we positively must either reclaim or
torment them. Wherever theological intolerance is admitted, it must
inevitably have some civil effect; and as soon as it has such an
effect, the Sovereign is no longer Sovereign even in the temporal
sphere: thenceforth priests are the real masters, and kings only their
ministers.
Now that there is and can be no longer an exclusive national religion,
tolerance should be given to all religions that tolerate others,
so long as their dogmas contain nothing contrary to the duties of
citizenship. But whoever dares to say: _Outside the Church is no
salvation,_ ought to be driven from the State, unless the State is the
Church, and the prince the pontiff. Such a dogma is good only in a
theocratic government; in any other, it is fatal. The reason for which
Henry IV is said to have embraced the Roman religion ought to make
every honest man leave it, and still more any prince who knows how to
reason.
Nonne ea quæ possidet Chamos deus tuus, tibi jure debentur?
(Judges xi. 24). Such is the text in the Vulgate. Father de Carrières
translates: "Do you not regard yourselves as having a right to what
your god possesses?" I do not know the force of the Hebrew text: but
I perceive that, in the Vulgate, Jephthah positively recognises the
right of the god Chamos, and that the French translator weakened this
admission by inserting an "according to you," which is not in the Latin.
It is quite clear that the Phocian war, which was called "the
Sacred War," was not a war of religion. Its object was the punishment
of acts of sacrilege, and not the conquest of unbelievers.
It should be noted that the clergy find their bond of union not so
much in formal assemblies, as in the communion of Churches. Communion
and ex-communication are the social compact of the clergy, a compact
which will always make them masters of peoples and kings. All priests
who communicate together are fellow-citizens, even if they come
from opposite ends of the earth. This invention is a masterpiece of
statesmanship: there is nothing like it among pagan priests; who have
therefore never formed a clerical corporate body.
See, for instance, in a letter from Grotius to his brother (April
11, 1643), what that learned man found to praise and to blame in the
De Cive. It is true that, with a bent for indulgence, he seems to
pardon the writer the good for the sake of the bad; but all men are not
so forgiving.
"In the republic," says the Marquis d'Argenson, "each man is
perfectly free in what does not harm others." This is the invariable
limitation, which it is impossible to define more exactly. I have not
been able to deny myself the pleasure of occasionally quoting from this
manuscript, though it is unknown to the public, in order to do honour
to the memory of a good and illustrious man, who had kept even in the
Ministry the heart of a good citizen, and views on the government of
his country that were sane and right.
Cæsar, pleading for Catiline, tried to establish the dogma that the
soul is mortal: Cato and Cicero, in refutation, did not waste time in
philosophising. They were content to show that Cæsar spoke like a bad
citizen, and brought forward a doctrine that would have a bad effect on
the State. This, in fact, and not a problem of theology, was what the
Roman senate had to judge.
Marriage, for instance, being a civil contract, has civil effects
without which society cannot even subsist. Suppose a body of clergy
should claim the sole right of permitting this act, a right which every
intolerant religion must of necessity claim, is it not clear that in
establishing the authority of the Church in this respect, it will be
destroying that of the prince, who will have thenceforth only as many
subjects as the clergy choose to allow him? Being in a position to
marry or not to marry people, according to their acceptance of such
and such a doctrine, their admission or rejection of such and such a
formula, their greater or less piety, the Church alone, by the exercise
of prudence and firmness, will dispose of all inheritances, offices
and citizens, and even of the State itself, which could not subsist
if it were composed entirely of bastards? But, I shall be told, there
will be appeals on the ground of abuse, summonses and decrees; the
temporalities will be seized. How sad! The clergy, however little, I
will not say courage, but sense it has, will take no notice and go its
way: it will quietly allow appeals, summonses, decrees and seizures,
and, in the end, will remain the master. It is not, I think, a great
sacrifice to give up a part, when one is sure of securing all.
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Simple English explanation
Civil religion asks what shared beliefs can support civic loyalty. Rousseau wants public commitment without church domination of the state. In simple terms, Rousseau is explaining how a free people can create public rules without turning political power into private domination.
1-minute summary
Civil religion asks what shared beliefs can support civic loyalty. Rousseau wants public commitment without church domination of the state.
Key takeaways
Political authority needs legitimacy, not only power.
Freedom depends on laws people can recognize as public, not private, will.
The common good is Rousseau’s test for political order.
Government is dangerous when it starts serving itself instead of the people.
Modern example
A modern constitution tries to solve the same problem: it must give officials enough power to govern while keeping that power answerable to the public good.
For kids
Rousseau is asking how people can make fair rules together without letting one person boss everyone around.